Quick start¶
Prerequisites¶
A Docker daemon, and gVisor (runsc) registered with it.
openblox will not run a sandbox without gVisor. It does not fall back to runc, and
that refusal is deliberate: falling back would silently run untrusted code on the host
kernel while the API kept reporting success.
Install gVisor per the official instructions, then register it:
If runsc is absent, Create returns an error wrapping sandbox.ErrRuntimeUnavailable
— branch on that if you want to degrade gracefully rather than fail.
Install¶
Run something¶
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log"
"github.com/blox-eng/openblox/pkg/docker"
"github.com/blox-eng/openblox/pkg/sandbox"
)
func main() {
ctx := context.Background()
backend, err := docker.New()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
defer backend.Close()
sb, err := backend.Create(ctx, "session-1",
sandbox.WithImage("ghcr.io/blox-eng/openblox-sandbox:latest"))
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
defer backend.Destroy(ctx, "session-1")
res, err := sb.Exec(ctx, sandbox.Command{
Argv: []string{"python3", "-c", "print(6 * 7)"},
})
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
fmt.Println(string(res.Stdout)) // 42
}
Create is keyed by name: calling it again with the same name returns the existing
sandbox rather than a second one. That makes it safe to call per request without
tracking what already exists.
A non-zero res.ExitCode is the program failing, not an openblox error. err is
reserved for openblox failing to run it at all.
Argv, not a shell string
Command.Argv is passed directly to exec. Nothing in it is parsed as shell
syntax, so a caller cannot accidentally create an injection by interpolating
untrusted text into a command line.
Files¶
err := sb.WriteFile(ctx, "/workspace/data.csv", 0o644, strings.NewReader("a,b\n1,2\n"))
rc, err := sb.ReadFile(ctx, "/workspace/out.json")
defer rc.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(rc)
Both stream, so they are safe for large payloads. Paths are absolute inside the
sandbox; /workspace is the working directory and is writable.
Background processes¶
err := sb.StartProcess(ctx, "web", sandbox.Command{
Argv: []string{"python3", "-m", "http.server", "8080", "--bind", "127.0.0.1"},
})
Idempotent: if something is already running under that name, it is left alone and no error is returned. Call it on every request rather than tracking state yourself.
Preview links¶
A sandbox has no network interface, so a port inside it is not reachable by any ordinary route. openblox reaches it over the exec channel and fronts it with a signed, expiring URL.
backend, err := docker.New(
docker.WithPreviews(signingKey, "https://example.com"), // key >= 32 random bytes
)
// Mount the handler where the signed URLs will resolve.
http.Handle(preview.RoutePrefix+"/", backend.PreviewHandler())
p, err := sb.Expose(ctx, 8080, 10*time.Minute)
// p.URL + p.Token — send the token as an Authorization header, never a query param.
Revocation is best-effort; expiry is the guarantee
Verification is a local HMAC check that consults no shared state, so Revoke only
holds in the process that recorded it. If you run several replicas, treat the TTL
as the real bound and keep it short.
Cleaning up¶
Call it from a ticker. It is safe to run concurrently with everything else, and safe to run from several processes at once.
Defaults¶
A sandbox created with no options gets:
| Runtime | runsc (gVisor) |
| Network | none |
| User | 1000:1000 (non-root) |
| Root filesystem | read-only |
| CPUs | 2 |
| Memory | 2 GiB |
| Scratch disk | 1 GiB (tmpfs, drawn from the memory budget) |
| Max processes | 256 |
| Idle timeout | 15 minutes |
| Max age | 2 hours |
| Command timeout | 60s default, 10m ceiling |
Scratch space is tmpfs, so it comes out of memory — keep disk at or below memory, and size both deliberately if your workload is heavy.